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During the 1980s  antidumping  measures  were increasingly  used to restrict imports. In
consequence,  a number of these actions  were appealed  by the victim countries  to the GATT, and to
1ate GATT panels have completed  their deliberations  in five cases.'  In each of the five the panel
found the antidumping  action io be in violation  of the GATT or the GATT code on antidumping,  but
so far, not one of these improper' antidumping  actions  has been lifted.
We will attempt  to gauge in this paper why the GATT dispute settlement  process has been so
ineffective  to now in disciplining  the use of antidumr.ping.  Our objectives  are to identify  the sources
of this ineffectiveness  and to evaluate  the likelihood  that the process will berome effective in the
future.
The following  section documents  the increased  use of antidu  . n,  as an instrument  of
protection  -- an increasing  number of actions by an increasing  number  oil  countries. Section  II
reviews the outcomes  of recent GATT dispute settlement  cases on antidumping  actions, and Sections
III and IV take up the why of the lack of impact  of these processes  on national  antidumping  actions.
Our focus there will be on the five cases in which panels have completed  their findings  and
recommendations. We conclude, in the final section, that GATT enforcement  is not likely to provide
effective  discipline  over national  use of antidumping. Both the bureaucratic  and the legal momentum
of GATT dispute settlement  is toward innocuous  findings -- focus on procedural  errors that can be
corrected  without lifting the antidumping  order in question.
I Foimally, only the EEC anti-circumvention  regulation  panel was appointed  by the GATT Council.
The other four were appointed  by the GATT Committee  on Antidumping  Practices  and Procedures.
2 As will be elaborated  below, the findings  of only one of the five have been approved as an official
GATT decision.  Thus when we state that an antidumping  action is "improper"  we do not mean that it
has been found to be, strictly speaking, "illegal" under the GATT.I. Increased  Use of Antidumping
Over the GATT's first thirty or so years, antidumping  actions  by national  governments  were a
minor problem. Few national  actions were taken and only one was challenged  at the GATT as
illegal. This complaint, raised by Italy against Sweden in 1954, was resolved  quickly  by Sweden
changing  the regulations  that had been questioned.  (Hudec 1975, p. 284)
Increased  antidumping
Through the early 1960s,  GATT member -ountries  (in total) undertook  fewer than a dozen
antidumping  actions per year.  However, by the latter half of the 1970s  the United States  alone
averaged thirty-five  cases per year, and as Table I shows, the frequency  across all GATT member
countries is now more than two hundred  per year.  Some forty countries, including  a number of
developing countries, have antidumping  regulations  in place, 3 and in 1991-9,;,  fourteen  of them were
active antidumpers.
The increased  use of antidumping  measures  has raised questions  about them.  Three widely
accepted  conclusions  are particularly  troubling: 4
1.  National regulations  allow antidumping  action in a broad range of
circumstances. The point is stated by different authors in different ways, e.g.,
that such regulations  are biased toward finding  dumping  and toward
3 GATT Secretariat estimate.
4  The increased  use of antidumping  has occasioned  a wave of research, focused  more or less on
learning how (administratively)  the instrument  work-s  and of judging the appropriateness  of the
resulting actions. The findings of this research are surveyed in Finger (1993a) especially  chapters 2
and 3, and in Finger (1993b). The conclusions  reported in the text are substantiated  in those surveys.
2overstating  dumping  margins (Bierwagen  1991; Litan and Boltuck 199  i) or
that antidumping  is just ordinary  protection  with a good public relations
program (Finger 1993a).
2.  The investigation  process itseif tends to curb imports. This is because
exporters  bear significant  legal and administrative  costs, importers  face the
uncertainty  of having to pay, once an investigation  is completed, backdated
antidumping  duties. (Finger 1981; Steiger  and Wolak 1993)
3.  As a consequence  of these traits, almost half of antidumping  actions are
superseded by negotiated  export restrictions  before they come to a formal,
legal, ending (Finger and Murray 1990).5
II. Antidumping  Actions  Taken to GATT
The increased  use and apparent misuse of antidumping  led exporters  to complain  tc their
governments,  these governments,  in turn, took up the actions  against their exporters with the
governments  who had taken the antidumping  actions. Since 1989, fifteen  national  antidumping
actionr have become the subject  of GATT dispute  settlement  procedures. 6 (The cases are listed in
Table 2.)  Of the panels appointed  by the GATT or the Antidumping  Committee  to examine
I The larger the case (the greater the value of imports  covered)  the higher the likelihood  that it will be
superseded by a negotiated  restraint.
6 The most recent four cases are requests for consultation  with the United States  on recent US
antidumping  duties on steel imports. The strategy of the US steel industry in the early 1980s  was to
use antidumping  petitions to force exporters  to negotiate  voluntary  export restraints. These restraints,
against every significant  exporter except Sweden,  who refused and was hit by antidumping  actions,
were put in place in 1985. When their initial five-year  life came to an end, President Bush  negotiated
extensions  for two and a half years.  Before  these extensions  expired the US industry was preparing
to petition for the antidumping  actions that have recently  been appealed  to GATT.
3antidumping  actions, five have completed  their findings and recofmmendations.  In summary form, the
outcomes  and results of these five cases have been as follows:
(1)  In each of the five the panel found the antidumping  action in question to be in
violation  of the GATT or the GATT antidumping  code.
(2)  As of this writing (July, 1993)  each of the five antidumping  actions is still in
place.
(3)  Only one panel report has been adopted as an "official"  GATT or
Antidumping  Committee  conc'usion  and recommendation.'
(4)  The last two panels have come to conclusions-recommnendations  distinctly
different from those of the first three.  The first three concluded  that the
antidumpng duty in question  should be removed. The last two have come to
the conclus;ion  that the antidumping  action in question involved  a violatiol.  of
the GA  T  T or the Antidumping  Code, but their recommendations  allow for the
possibility  that the antidumping  need not be removed.
(5)  Failure of the panel's report to be adopted is in one instance because  the
winner is not satisfied  with the decision. (This relates to point 4, above.)
If the system is gravitating  toward the sort of innocuous  finding  described in point (4) above--
procedural error that can be fixed without  removing  the antidumping  duty then the GATT dispute
settlement  process is not likely to check the increased  incidence  of ar.2idumping  restrictions. We will
however argue that this pessimistic  outcome  is the most likely one, that the institutional  dynamics  of
the system is toward this sort of decision. The central  tendency of GATT's decisions  on antidumping
I Traditionally  the GATT and the Antidumping  Commnittee  reach decisions  by consensus,  hence one
country can block a panel's report from being  adopted as the decision  of the institution. This is
often, but not always, the country  fuund by the panel to be in the wrong.
4actions is to find a technical error that does not mandate the antidumping  duty be rei.loved. Both the
bureauc,dtic  and the legal dynamics  of the system push in this direction.
III. The Bureaucratic  Momentun:
GATT Requests  and National  Regulations
What happens when the GATT Council or Antidumping  Commit*ee  concludes  that a national
antidumping  action violates the GATT or the Antidumping  Code? In practical terms, the answers it
the United States  and in the European  Community  are sirnilar, though the presence  of legal detail
makes the US case easier to ex9lain  8
The structure of US antidumping  law, like that of other US trade remedies laws is as follows.
Under specified  circumstances  the administering  agency in the US government  will initiat, an
antidumping  investigation. If, through that investigation  the named  administering  agency determines
that certain conditions  exist (durnping  and consequent  injury to a domestic industry; and how to
determine  each of these is specified in scores of pages of law and hundreds  of pages of administrative
regulations), then an antidumping  order is put in place (i.e., an antidumping  duty is imposed  on
specified imports.) Similarly,  if other specified  investigations  determine  other specified conditions  to
exist, the antidumping  order is lifted.
To say much the same in a different way, the US Constitution  gives to the US Congress  the
authority to regulate US foreign trade, and the Congress  has delegated  to the Executive  the authority
in certain circumstances to change such regulations.  But a GATT or Antidumping Committee
conclusion  or request is not one of the circumstances  in which Congress  has given the Executive  the
8 Jackson, Louis and Matsushita  (1984)  analyze  how GATT and the GATT codes fit into national
l1gal systems.
5authority to act.  Such a conclusion  or recommendation  is not one of the conditions  that lifts an
antidumping  order -- or even  justifies the opening  of a review.
Thus the straightforward  answer to "What  happens?"  is that nothing happens. In US law,
nothing follows automatically  from a GATT conclusion  that a US antidumping  acLion  was taken
inconsistently  with US obligations  under the GATT or the Antidumping  Code.  Likewise  for EEC
antidumping  regulations.
Though a GATT finding  that a US action was in violation  has no legal impact in the United
States, 9 it will bring pressure on the Executive  branch to bring the United  States into compliance.
For one thing, the finding would be an embarrassment. An international  organization  of which the
United  States is a founding  member (and in which Fxecutive  branch officials represent the United
States  government)  has formally found the United  States  to be in violation  of the organization's rules.
And as a practical matter, the situation weakens  the position  of the US government  to press a foreign
country likewise in violation  to remove a restriction  that might be of commercial  interest to the
United  States.
Pressure from the US Congress  would be in the other direction. The authority of the GATT
over US trade law has been a hotly contested  battlefield  in the ongoing  struggle  between the
Executive  and the Congress over the shape of US trade policy. For example,  the Congress in the
1979  trade act made a good faith effort to make the changes  that the US Executive  had negotiated  at
the Tokyo Round, but the Congress  stated explicitly  in the act that if any conflict  of interpretation
were to occur, the trade act and not the GATT or codec was the authority. A change of US policy
triggered by a GATT finding would be a victory for the Executive  in this struggle.
9 Likewise  in the EEC and in many other  jurisdictions.
6The Congressional  politics of trade policy also comes to bear.  The antidumping  law has been
constructed  amendment  by amendment  in response  to pressures from particular interest groups." 0
Constituent  service is the lifeblood of Congressional  politics, and fixing  a powerful  constituent's  trade
probiem by adding  to the definition  of injury or of dumping  is an important  part of this politics.  In
this context, the Congress  woild not be charitably  disposed  toward interference  from a GATT panel
decision -- particularly  one based on a technicality  suL.h  as the US investigation  having verified the
staneing of the petitioner  during the investigation  rather than before initiating  the investigation. That
was the basis for the panel's finding  against the US antidumping  duty on imports  of stainless  steel
tubes from Sweden.
Another important  consideration  is that, as '.  M. Destler  (1992) has pointed out, antidumping
and the other trade remedies laws provide "protection  for Congress" -- protection  from havirg to deal
with the specifics of deciding which industries  rec-ive protection  and how much.  With the trade
remedies in place, a member of Congress  pressed by a constituent  industry  for protection  can refer
the industry to the administering  trade remedies agencies. Or if the constituent  is powerful and has
gone through the trade remedies  process without  success, advise the constituent  to develop an
appropriate  trade remedies  amendment  and submit it the next time a trade bill is in the works.  Thus
the trade remedies not only create a vehicle for constituent  service, they provide members  of
Congress a system for managing  the delivery of that service.
,A request from a GATT panel to remove an antidumping  duty conflicts  with that system.  As
U.S. law is written, removing  the duty would  require a specific vo-e of the Congress. but for the
several reasons  just reviewed, the U.S. Congress  is not likely to respond.
l  ,e  Executive  would be in a much better situation if the Antidumping  Committee  pointed out
procedural shortcomings  and made the amorphous  request that the United States "bring its measure
'0 This point is elaborated  and documented  in Finger (1992).
7into conformity." To understand  the situation the U.S. Executive  would then face, suppose  this
request -- the United  States bring its measures  into conformity  -- had been in the case of stainless
steel tubes from Sweden. In this case the panel found the United  States at odds with the GATT rules
on the matter of when the US investigators  verified that the petition  had in fact been made "by or on
behalf of" a domestic industry. The U.S. investigators  had done so during their investigation  rather
than before they began it.
The GATT request  could then be corn  ted by a pro-forma  reconsideration,  in which the
investigators  carefully  and for the record considered  the evidence  that the petition  had been made by
or on behalf of a domestic industry, then formally initiated  the investigation. By virtue of this
reconsideration,  the U.S. measure  would be in conformity  with the panel's conclus;on,  the
antidumping  duty would still be in place, and Executive  branch officials would have avoided a
confrontation  with Congress.
IV. The Legal  Momentun: Trade Remedies  in the GATT
A panel outcome  that can be accommodated  without  removing  the antidumping  duty that has
been found in violation  is not just the easy way out.  The legal momentum  of the system likewise
presses toward findings that hinge  on procedural  issues without  seriously questioning  that imports
have been dumped  and the industry injured. This is because the conditions  under which antidumping
rules allow import protection  are broad.  Because  the substantive  dimension  is broad, imposing
procedural detail is the only way to limit antidumping  actions. But because  the substance  of the rules
justifies widespread  restrictions, the procedural  details that limit antidumping  action will seem
arbitrary -- in conflict  with the basic thrust of the rules.
8The GATT orivins of trade remedies
To understand  the logic of the trade remedies in the GATT, one must go back to GATT's
beginning. The post-World  War II deliberat;-.rns  on institutional  arrangements  for the world economy
were successful in establishing  the International  Monetary  Fund and the World Bank.  However, the
proposed Iriternational  Trade Organization  which would regulate international  trade was not to be.
There was a reluctance  among  governments  to accept institutionalized  restrictions  onl  the conduct of
countries' national  trade policies.
At the same time the ITO negotiations  over the "rules" of the trading system were
unsuccessful  the community  of nations reached agreement  on a significant  package of reciprocal  tariff
reductions. The document  or contract that gave legal effect to this agreed exchange  of market access
(tariff cuts) was the General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade.  It is important  to remember  that,
functionally  speaking,  the GATT was not the "agreement,"  it was the paperwork to put that
agreement intc place.
The first functional  part of the agreement  delivered  the goods, the agreed exchange of tariff
cuts.  The legal mechanics  of doing so was a commitment  by each participating  country to allow other
participants  access to its market at least as favorable  as the schedule  of its import restrictions  that the
country arnexed to the agreement. When agreement  involved  reductions  of tariffs, the negotiated
reductions  were reflected  in this schedule. Each schedule,  the parties agreed, would be subject to
MFN treatment within the gioup.
The second finctional part of the contract  (lefined  the circumstances  under which a country
might go back on the access it had guaranteed  to its trad.ng partners in the first part, e.g.,  restrictions
to safeguard  the balance  of payments, antidumping  and countervailing  duties. The third functional
part deals with dispute  settlement  or restitution  -- what a country  can do when it senses that some
benefits to it under the contract  have been compromised.
9Note please the structure of the "trade remedies"  provisions  of the GATT:
*  they state explicitly  that a country  may impose  new inport restrictions,
*  they attempt to limit  application  of this permission  by specifying  the
circumstances  in and procedures  by which a country may impose  new
restrictions.
Substantive  standards  for antidumping  are broad
The basic concept underlying  the trade remedies  is injury to competing  domestic producers
from import competition. This is, in economics,  a close parallel to comparative  disadvantage,  hence
allowing for import restrictions  wherever  there is injury is a broad allowance.
GATT article VI, that allows antidumping  duties, requires  more than injury, it also required
that the imports  that cause injury are being priced unfairly, or dumped. But national  politics has
added so many new dimensions  to what may be considered  dumping  that virtually  any international
transaction  can be found to be dumped. (Boltuck-Litan,  1991, provide  extensive  documentation.)
These national  changes have been added in large part to the international  code.  The 1979 Tokyo
Round antidumping  code provides  broader scope for restrictions  than did the 1968  Kennedy Round
code, the Uruguay Round draft would  broaden the present code even more.'"
While anti-trust law is constrained  by economic  logic, antidumping  law is not.  Ronald A.
Cass (1993), a prominent legal scholar  and former Chairman of the U.S. International  Trade
Commission,  has madle  the following  observation:
In putting flesh on the statutory  bones of antitrust constraints  on predation and price
discrimination, both courts and the relevant enforcement agencies ...  have been
influenced  by the substantial  body of positive economic  writings  on these subjects.
This point is documented  Finger-Dhar  (1993).
10If decisions  do not always conform  to mainstream  commentators'  views on how
predation should be identified  or when price discrimination  is anticompetitive,  there is
ample attention  to issues  economic  theory suggests  are central to the analytical  task.
International  trade law, in contrast, has been strikingly impervious  to even the most
elementary  aspects of economic  analysis. Antidumping  law is exemplary.  (pp. 880-1)
Many possibilities  for procedural  error
The legal basis for an investigation  of dumping  duty is a detailed  examination  of price data,
involving  literally hundred of choices as to how to adjust for one factor or another: differences  in
product characteristics  between the export and the home market sales, differences  in credit terms, in
dealing through a distributor versus selling directly  to users, exchange rate variations, etc.  Likewise,
an investigation  of injury involves  many such considerations,  and administrators,  in order to avoid
being drowned in detail, must depend  on rules of thumb." 2
An antiduniping  investigation  is thus a long sequence  of technical  adjustments,  not guided by
any overarching  economic  or legal sense of objective. Furthermore,  the GATT code has significant
"transparency"  requirements:  if an investigation  specifies  what it did in each instance in which an
adjustment  is made, it runs the risk of being at odds with what the panel concludes is the relevant
detail in the code.  And if the investigation  is vague about  these adjustments,  it risks violating  the
transparency requirements.
Free trade, not protection  depends  on the loopholes
While it is instinctive  to presume  that those seeking  import restrictions  have been winning by
deceit and trickery, cynically  exploiting  loopholes  and pressing vulnerable  members  of Congress  to
12 Hudec, Kennedy  and Sgarbossa  (1993)  provide  documentation.
11introduce new ones, the opposite  is more nearly true.  Free trade, not protection  depends on the
loopholes  and technicalities.  We will present here a pair of examples." 3
The loopholes  on which the Executive  branch used to depend  on were not subtle. Before
1974, there was no time limit for completing  a countervailing  duty investigation. The U.S. Treasury
Department,  then the administering  agency, often used this loophole,  defeating requests for an import
restriction  by never completing  the investigation. In 1974  Congress  imposed  deadlines, the GATT
antidumping  code of 1979  provides for them.
The Congress  has broadened  the meaning of dumping  and of injur  ii,zny  ways, most of
which make sense if one accepts the basic premise of the law.  The treatme  '"<umulation"  is an
example. Some years back, a U.S. industry losing sales to a vigorous Korea. .nd  *try  could establish
that it was injured and gain import relief.  But the same U.S. industry, if being nibbled to death by
the combined  effects of fifty competitors,  could  not gain relief.  Injury from each of the fifty would
be considered  separately,  and not one would  be significant  enough to reach the threshold of
"material"  injury needed  to gain import relief.  Eventually  Congress  amended  the antidumping  law to
make "cumulation"  necessary, i.e., to provide  the same relief for a U.S. industry beset by a school of
piranhas  as was already available to an industry  disabled  by one shark.  Cumulation  is now provided
for in the antidumping  code.
'I.  Conclusions:  A Legalistic  Approach  Implies  a Protectionist  Answer
The conclusion  is obvious --and ominous. The GATT dispute settlement  process seems
unlikely to provide discipline  against the increasing  number  of antidumping  restrictions  against
imports. Both the bureaucratic  and the legal momentum  of GATT dispute  settlement  are toward
3 A more detailed treatment is provided in Finger (1992).
12innocuous findings of procedural  error that can be corrected  without lifting the antidumping  order in
question.
Changing  the bureaucratic  momentum  of the system is possible, but it would not be easy.  It
would require greater resolve on the part of member countries' GATT delegates  to see that GATT
rules are enforced  -- a greater willingness  to stand up to domestic  pressures to bend GATT rules into
accord with the demands  of national  politics.
Changing  the legal momentum  of the system will be even more difficul.  Interpreting  the
GATT in a legalistic  way compels  one to interpret it as a statement  of rights to impose  antidumping
duties. The substantive  criteria for action are broad -- the injury concept  justifies protection for
anyone to whom it is worth the time to ask for it.  The constraints  on antidumping  actions are
artificial -- loophoies and procedural  technicalities -- so legal reform means getting rid of them.
In sum, where do !he GATT articles  on trade remedies  lead us?  If you take a legalistic  view,
you come to a protectionist  conclusion.
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15Table  1
Antidumping Initiations, July 1985 - June 1992
(by country in which the case was prosecuted)
Time  J85-  J86-  J87-  J88-  J89-  J90-  J91-  All|
Country, group  Timej  386  J87  J88  J89  0  J91  J92  Yrs
Numbe. s of cases
Developed Countries  169  134  110  99  81  134  198  925
United States  63  41  31  25  24  52  62  298
Australia  54  40  20  19  23  46  76  278
European  23  24  30  29  15  15  23  159
Community  l
Canada  27  24  20  14  15  12  16  128
Developing Countries  3  1  3  14  14  17  39  91
loland  0  0  0  0  0  24  0  24
All Countries  172  135  113  113  95  175  237  1040
Percentages  l
Developed Countries  98  99  97  88  85  77  84  89
United States  37  30  27  22  25  30  26  29
Australia  31  30  18  17  24  26  32  27
European  13  18  27  26  16  9  10  15
Conmmunity  I
Canada  16  18  18  12  16  7  7  12
Developing Countries  2  1  3  12  15  10  16  9
Poland  0  0  0  0  0  14  0  2
All Countries  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Annex Table  "Summary of Antidumping
Actions,  [date]" 1985-86 through 1991-91 volumes.Table 2
Antidumping Cases Taken to
GATT Dispute Settlement
Applicant  Respondent  Subject  Most recently reported action
Japan  United States  Provisional antidumping  Consultation requested
measures on steel products  16 Jun  1993
Sweden  Uni ed States  Provisional antidumping  Consultation requested
measurcs on cut-to-length  7 Apr 93
l _______________  __________________  steel plate
EEC  United States  AD investigation on steel  Consultation requested
__  __  __  _  __  _  __  _  __  __  __  _  products  2 Mar 93
Brazil  United States  AD and CVD actions on  Consultation requested
steel products  10 Feb 93
Brazil  Mexico  AD investigation on textiles  Consultation requested
16 Oct 92
Brazil  Mexico  AD proceedings on  electric  Consultation requested
power transformers  15 Oct 92
Brazil  EEC  Antidumping investigations  Consultation requested
on cotton yarn from  Brazil  3 Sep 91
Japan  EEC  AD proceedings on audio  Panel established
tapes and cassettes  26 Oct 92
United States  Canada  AD duties on beer  Panel established  9 Jul 92  _
Sweden  United States  AD duties on stainless steel  Panel established
plate  27 Apr 92
United States  Korea  polyacetal resins  Panel report adopted
(duties)  27 Apr 93
Mexico  United States  AD dduties on cement and  Panel report circulated




Norway  United States  salmon, fresh and chilled  Panel report circulated
(duties)  30 Nov  1992
Adoption requested
26 Apr 93
Sweden  United States  seamless ss pipes and tubes  Panel report circulated
(duties)  20 AuF 90
Adoption requested
27 Apr 92
Japan  EEC  regulation of imports of  Panel report adopted  16 May
(under the  parts and components  90.
GA, not under  Issues of implementation
AD code)  raised,  most recently 3 Dec
H _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  9  2
Sources:  GATT Council, Status of Work in Panels and Implementation of Panel Reports,  C/183,  4
June 1993; GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices,  United States - Provisional Antidumping
Measures Against  Imports on Certain ...  Steel Products, ADP/100,  16 June  1993.Table 3
Outcomes:  Antidumping  Cases Appealed  to GATT Panels
1. EEC Anti-circumvention  regulation
Conclusion:
(a) EEC anti-circumvention  duties and decisions  to accept undertakings  in lieu of imposing  such duties
are inconsistent with ...
Recommendation:'
The EEC bring its regulations  into conformity  with its obligations  under GATT. The Panel noted that
the EEC would be in conformity  if it did not apply  the anti-circumvention  regulation  against GATT
member countries.
2. United  States - Stainless  steel tubes  from Sweden
Conclusions:
(a) Initiation of the investigation  was inconsistent  with US obligations ...
(b) The relevant code provision is an essential  procedural requirement. The infringement  could not
be corrected retroactively.
Recommendation:
The United States revoke the antidumping  order and reimburse  antidumping  duties already paid.
3.  United States - Cement from  Mexico
(a) Initiation  of the investigation  was inconsistent  with US obligations ...
(b) The infringement  could not be corrected retroactively.
Recommendation:
The United States revoke  the antidumping  order and reimburse  antidumping  duties already paid.Table 3 continued
4.  United  States - Salmon from  Norway
Conclusions:
(a) On several points of methodology  in determining  the r 3rgin of dumping, the United  States acted
inconsistently with its obligations  ...
(b) Appropriate  methodology  would not necessarily  result in a determination  of no dumping  (rather
than a different margin.) Therefore the Panel could not recommend  that the United  States revoke the
antidumping  duty order and reimburse  any duties paid or deposited.
Recommendation:
The United States reconsider  the affirmative  tinal determination  on dumping  and bring its measures
with respect to imports of Salmon  from Norway into conformity  with its obligations...
5. Korea - Polvacetvl  resins from the United States
Conclusions:
On several points of methodology  of determining  injury, Korea acted inconsistently  with its
obligations ...
Recommendation:
Korea bring its measure (the imposition  of these antidumping  duties) into conformity with its
obligations  ...
Note:
1.  Strictly speaking, a panel suggests  or recommends  that the GATT CONTRACTING  PARTIES  or
the Antidumping Committee (as is relevant) request that the country  ....  In this table we have used
simpler wording.Policy Research  Working  Paprbr  Series
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